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Federal Venue: Locating the
Place Where the Claim Arose
Diane Pamela Wood
Venue, because it receives so little attention from the appellate
courts, sometimes seems to be the forgotten cousin in the family of
federal procedure. Fathered by the Constitution itself is the concept of
subject matter jurisdiction, whose imperatives circumscribe every federal
case.' Of like importance is personal jurisdiction, which dictates when a
person or res has fallen under the power of the court.' The place of
venue in this hierarchy has often seemed obscure: the concept enjoys
statutory sanction, but its status falls below that of jurisdiction. This
second class citizenship is precisely what venue merits, if amount of time
invested in litigating is the measure of importance. The entire thrust of
procedural reform in this century has been toward shifting the center of
litigational gravity from procedures to the merits.' In keeping with this
general philosophy, the goal of the statutory venue system should be to
consume as little judicial time as is consistent with overall fairness to all
the parties to the lawsuit.
The concept of venue, that there is a particular place where trial
should be held,4 is as old as the separation of the king's general court
1. U.S. CONST. art. III enumerates the types of cases or controversies over which
the federal courts may exercise jurisdiction and specifies the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction. With the exception of the Court's original jurisdiction, the power of the
federal courts to hear cases depends on both constitutional and statutory grants of subject
matter jurisdiction. See generally C. WmosrT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FDERAL
CouRTs §§ 8, 10 (2d ed. 1970). This rule is inflexible; any time it appears that subject
matter jurisdiction is lacking, the court is duty-bound to dismiss the case sua sponte. E.g.,
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
2. The classic case that describes the rationale behind personal jurisdiction is
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). In modem times, the original territorial raison
d'etre of the concept has become attenuated within the fifty states. It has been replaced
by the twin ideas of fair play and substantial justice, enunciated in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Fair play and substantial justice depend on certain
"minimum contacts" with the jurisdiction, according to International Shoe; this standard
still remains the due process test for the outer limits on the court's power to command
the presence of a person or to adjudicate the status of a res. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958); Edwards v. Associated Press, 512 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1975).
3. See, e.g., 4 C. Wsr.GHT & A. MImLmE, FEDERAL PRAcTnCE AND PROCEDURE § 1029,
at 128 (1969).
4. See United States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 918 (1969); Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp.
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into the specialized courts of the Exchequer, Common Pleas, King's
Bench, and Chancery.5 Originally, venue was the servant of the court's
convenience and assured the availability of jurors who knew the facts of
a case.6 As time passed, the overriding concern of venue law underwent
a complete transformation, shifting from the court to the litigants, both
in England and in the United States. Thus, in the leading case of Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,7 the Supreme Court could state as
settled law that "the locality of a law suit-the place where judicial
authority may be exercised-though defined by legislation relates to the
convenience of litigants and as such is subject to their disposition."' In a
later case, the Court remarked that "the venue provisions are designed,
not to keep suits out of the federal courts, but merely to allocate suits to
the most appropriate. . . forum."9
To establish the convenience of litigants as the paramount concern,
however, is only to pose a new question, for the interests of the two
parties may well diverge. A choice between plaintiff and defendant may
be unavoidable. Perhaps the primary consideration should be to protect
the defendant, since he does not control the litigation. Alternatively, per-
haps the goal ought to be to ensure that the plaintiff does not lose his
day in court because of the expense and difficulty of litigating far from
home. Ideally, the location of each trial would optimize the interests
of protection of defendant, fairness to plaintiff, speed of trial, and
availability of witnesses. Barring achievement of this ideal, if liberal
transfer statutes can protect the defendant adequately, and modern
transportation facilities can minimize evidentiary problems, then it
makes sense to give effect to the plaintiff's initial choice of venue, assum-
ing that he chooses a forum with a logical relation to his claim. This
solution facilitates reaching the merits without lingering on procedural
219, 224 (D.NJ. 1966). Venue should be distinguished from jurisdiction, which relates
to the court's power to act. See Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carl J. Austad &
Sons, Inc., 343 F.2d 7 (8th Cir. 1965); Brown v. Pyle, 310 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1962).
5. Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1949). The first court
to become settled in one place was the Exchequer, which established its permanent
residence sometime before the end of the twelfth century. Id. at 2-3. At the same time
the notion of an appropriate location for the lawsuit emerged, these early courts also
became specialized as to subject matter jurisdiction.
6. Id. at 3, 20.
7. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
8. Id. at 168. See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953);
Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 1966); Riley v. Union Pac. R.R.,
177 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 911 (1950).
9. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kookum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 710 (1972).
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details, and it permits plaintiffs to enforce their legal rights without un-
due hardship."0
I. The 1966 Amendment to 28 U.S.C. Section 1391: Background and
Purpose
The central statute governing federal venue today, 28 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1391,11 establishes venue for all cases in the federal courts, subject
to specific provisions in other statutes."2 In addition to statutory limita-
tions, section 1391 is still fettered by the traditional distinction between
local actions and transitory actions, tautologically explained by Chief
Justice Marshall as follows:
The distinction taken is, that actions are deemed transitory,
where transactions on which they are founded, might have
taken place anywhere; but are local where their cause is in
its nature necessarily local.'"
When the federal venue statutes mention the term "local," they assume
that its meaning is clear.14 This assumption may be sadly unwarranted,
10. Candidly, this is a plaintiff-oriented solution. It is, however, consistent with the
procedural rules requiring a liberal reading of the complaint, see FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f),
and a generous attitude toward amendments to pleadings, see FFn. R. Crv. P. 15.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970).
12. Some statutes completely supplant the provisions of § 1391. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §
1400 (1970) (patents and copyrights), construed in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957); 28 U.S.C. § 1394 (1970) (national banking
associations), construed in First Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504 (1920). In other
cases some dispute exists whether the general statute and the specific are supplementary
or exclusive. Compare Manufacturers Buyers Corp. v. El Dorado Tire Co., 324 F. Supp.
225 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (antitrust venue provision, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), preempts §
1391), with Albert Levine Associates v. Bertoni & Cotti, 314 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (specific antitrust venue supplements '§ 1391). See also Fox-Keller, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (supplementary). Note,
however, that § 1391 specifies venue "except as otherwise provided by law."
13. Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 664 (No. 8411) (C.C.D. Va. 1811).
Local actions normally deal with land matters, such as trespass, injury to real estate, and
title. See Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 107 (1895); Miller v. Davis,
507 F.2d 308, 316 n.16 (6th Cir. 1974); Elk Garden Co. v. T.W. Thayer Co., 179 F.
556 (4th Cir. 1910). Transitory actions are then defined negatively, since they are not
tied to any specific res; if an action is not local, it is transitory, and the court must
acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's person. See Stone v. United States, 167 U.S.
178 (1897); Sax v. Sax, 294 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1961); Mauser v. Union Pac. R.R., 243
F. 274 (S.D. Cal. 1917).
Later courts have protested the tyranny of the old rule, one judge complaining that
.it is not easy to escape the past, and the tentacles of the common law causes of
action survive as a tangled web requiring careful attention to outmoded procedural
concepts." Wheatley v. Phillips, 228 F. Supp. 439, 440 (W.D.N.C. 1964) (Craven, C.J.).
The rule nevertheless persists.
14. Two statutes expressly recognize "local" suits: 28 U.S.C. § 1392 (1970) (venue
where defendants reside in different districts of the same state); id. § 1393 (venue in
proper division of district).
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for as a matter of practice courts hold both that state law defines a local
action and that state law fixes its venue.' 5 Section 1391 therefore applies
only to transitory actions,' 6 although in point of fact transitory actions
do make up the vast bulk of federal business. Supplementing the general
venue statute are two critical provisions that permit transfer of venue
under special circumstances: section 1404(a),' 7 allowing transfer for
the convenience of parties and in the interest of justice, and section
1406(a),'8 allowing transfer or dismissal when the claim is filed in the
wrong district or division. Relative newcomers to the venue system,' 9
these provisions supply needed flexibility20 and give defendants protec-
tion against truly inconvenient forums. On the negative side, they have
filled the law reports with an inordinate number of venue decisions,
because the courts have interpreted the permissible transfer districts very
restrictively. 21 Nevertheless, the ease of transfer is directly related to
the number of authorized districts in the first place; thus if the general
venue statute is expanded through legislation or interpretation, the
transfer statutes will follow suit.
Section 1391 has progressed through several permutations since
the Judiciary Act of 1789 originally provided for venue in civil cases.22
Its direct ancestor was the Act of March 3, 1887, as corrected a year
15. Mississippi & Mo. RR. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485 (1863); Tuscarora
Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, 161 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 841 (1958); Hasburgh v. Executive Aircraft Co., 35 F.R.D. 354 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
See generally C. Wiuosrr, supra note 1, § 42, at 157-58.
16. E.g., Elk Garden Co. v. T.W. Thayer Co., 179 F. 556 (4th Cir. 1910); Pellerin
Laundry Mach. Sales Co. v. Hogue, 219 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Ark. 1963); Cobb v.
National Lead Co., 215 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Ark. 1963). See generally 1 W. BARaoN & A.
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 72, at 362 (Wright ed. 1960).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
18. Id. § 1406(a).
19. The transfer provisions were added in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code.
See generally C. WiuGsrr, supra note 1, § 44, at 162 & n.1.
20. Nevertheless, both transfer provisions are indirectly limited by the original venue
statute: § 1404(a) permits transfer only to a district or division where the claim "might
have been brought," and § 1406(a) is similarly limited to the place where it "could have
been brought."
21. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960); Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the
Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice?, 40 IND. L.J 99 (1965); Note, The
Problems Regarding the Federal Transfer Statute-Much Ado About Nothing, 42 ST.
JoHN's L REv. 93 (1967).
22. The Act provided:
[No civil suit shall be brought . . . against an inhabitant of the United States,
by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an in-
habitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ ....
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79. For a discussion of the historical
development of the venue laws see Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal
Courts--Suggestions For Reform, 7 Vm-m. L. REv. 608, 609-12 (1954).
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later.2" The 1887 Act awkwardly stated that suit should not be brought
in
any other district than that whereof [the defendant] is an in-
habitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the
-fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit
shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either
the plaintiff or the defendant.24
Why Congress chose to be more generous in diversity cases than in the
new federal question cases has remained a mystery;25 nevertheless, the
discrepancy has survived several revisions and persists in -the law to-
day.2 ' Little change took place until the 1948 revision of the Judicial
Code, and even then the alterations were comparatively minor phrasing
changes.27
In 1959, the Judicial Conference of the United States recommend-
ed that the general venue statute be broadened for tort actions to include
the place where the tort was committed. 2 Three years later, the Confer-
ence endorsed a more sweeping change, which would have added as a
permissible venue any district where the claim arose. 29 Congress re-
sponded cautiously in 1963 with an amendment permitting venue in
automobile tort cases in the district where the act or omission oc-
curred..8 0
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888,
ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433.
24. Id.
25. The choice is baffling for several reasons. First, both the initial justification for
diversity jurisdiction and its continuing merit have been hotly debated. See generally P.
BATOR, D. SuAPmo, P. MisHInn & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHLSLEW'S TE FEDERAL
CoURTs AND Tim FEDERAL SYSTEM 1053-59 (2d ed. 1973); C. WmI-rr, supra note 1, §
23. Second, one would think that Congress would want to facilitate federal question
cases in the federal courts, because the federal courts would have a body of expertise to
contribute, but Congress did not confer general federal question jurisdiction on the
federal courts until it passed the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
26. No change in this aspect of the statute was made in the 1948 revision of the
Judicial Code. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935. Neither was it changed
in the subsequent amendments contained in the Acts of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748,
§ 2, 76 Stat. 744; Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-234, 77 Stat. 473; and Nov. 2, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-714, §§ 1, 2, 80 Stat 1111.
27. In place of the phrase "whereof he is an inhabitant" the revisor put the word
"reside[s]." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935. The other change brought the
statute into harmony with the Supreme Court's construction of its meaning by substitut-
ing "all plaintiffs" and "all defendants" for the singular of those terms. Id. See Smith
v. Lyon, 133 U.S. 315 (1890).
28. Annual Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, at 316 (1959).
29. Annual Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, at 11 (1962).
30. Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-234, 77 Stat. 473 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1391(f)).
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Even with the 1963 patchwork, section 1391 was still in serious
need of mending. Perhaps the most appalling aspect was the gaping hole
that existed in multiple-party diversity actions: unless all of the plaintiffs
or all of the defendants resided in a single district, the action simply
could not be entertained in federal court,3 however satisfactory jurisdic-
tion and process might be. In a federal question case, it was enough to
bar venue if two defendants resided in different districts. If the parties in
the latter case were unfortunate enough to have suffered an injury
cognizable exclusively in the federal courts, they were utterly denied the
right to sue. Even if they were not literally locked out of court, they were
frequently compelled to litigate in a district convenient to neither side.32
Because courts strictly construed "residence" to mean legal domicile, 33
the cases were legion in which the parties faced the dismal prospect of
litigating miles from home, witnesses, and records. The vagaries of state
process statutes posed yet another problem, particularly for a plaintiff
relying on his own residence for venue in a diversity case. Whether his
own state's long-arm statute could reach the defendant was a matter of
pure fortuity. Finally, Congress again failed to eradicate the anomaly
permitting more venue options in diversity cases than in federal question
cases.
3 4
In 1966, Congress attempted once again to cure the deficiencies in
the venue system. Responding to the continued pressure of the Judicial
Conference3" and to the criticisms of commentators and scholars, 6 it
added the district "in which the claim arose" to subsections (a)37 and
(b)18 of section 1391, and repealed the special automobile subsection. 39
31. C. WRiGHTr, supra note 1, § 42, at 151; Barrett, supra note 22, at 621.
32. C. WxuGHT, supra note 1, § 42, at 151; Barrett, supra note 22, at 612. The
transfer provisions could not alleviate this situation since the original scope of venue was
so narrow. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
33. King v. Wall & Beaver St. Corp., 145 F.2d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Smith v.
Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
34. See note 25 supra.
35. See S. REP. No. 1752, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966).
36. E.g., Barrett, supra note 22, at 608-09; Blume, supra note 5, at 39-40. See also
Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MicH. L. Rv. 307 (1951)
(discussion of state venue statutes).
37. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, § 1(a), 80 Stat. 1111, amending Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391(a), 62 Stat. 935, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970)
(actions based solely on diversity).
38. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, § 1(b), 80 Stat. 1111, amending Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391(b), 62 Stat. 935, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
(1970) (actions not based solely on diversity).
39. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, § 2, 80 Stat. 1111, repealing Act of
Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-234, 77 Stat. 473.
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The meager legislative history of the amendment sheds no light on why
Congress chose this particular wording over numerous possible alterna-
tives. 40 The suggested phrasings included "where the cause of action or
part arose,"4 1 "where the cause of action, or part thereof, arose or
accrued,42 and the American Law Institute's "[where a] substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated. 43
Although the reports and debates indicate that Congress may not have
foreseen the wide application of the new law,4 4 experience under the
amendment has proven it useful in areas as diverse as antitrust,45 patent
and trademark infringement, 46 securities law,4 7 and labor law.48 The
courts, perhaps better able to see the forest for the trees, have consistent-
ly viewed the amendment as part of a general trend to expand venue
wherever possible.49
By opening up the forum in which the claim arose, the amendment
eliminated with one stroke the most egregious shortcoming of the former
40. The Senate Report on the bill consisted of an uninformative quote from the
House Report:
This enlargement of venue authority will facilitate the disposition of both con-
tract and tort claims by providing, in appropriate cases, a more convenient
forum to the litigants and the witnesses involved.
S. REP. No. 1752, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1966). Yet the chief sponsor of the bill in
the House reassured another member that the legislation would not affect tort venue at
all, as it was aimed only at minor changes in contract actions. 112 CONG. REC. 21756
(1966) (remarks of Representative Brooks).
41. Blume, supra note 5, at 39.
42. Stevens, supra note 36, at 310.
43. ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN THE STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS §§ 1303, 1314 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY]. Tentative Draft No.
2, 1964, contained essentially the same language.
44. See note 40 supra.
45. E.g., Morton Bldgs. of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 333 F. Supp. 187,
193 (D. Neb. 1971); Albert Levine Associates v. Bertoni & Cotti, 31-4 F. Supp. 169, 170
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
46. E.g, Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184, 189-90 (D.
Del. 1974) (trademark); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Sperberg, 63 F.R.D. 55, 59-60 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (declaratory judgment for patent).
47. E.g., Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 164, 168-69
(W.D. Mo. 1970); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079, 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
48. E.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 290 F. Supp.
612, 615-16 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1969).
49. Penrod Drilling Co. v. Johnson, 414 F.2d 1217, 1224-25 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970). See Gardner Eng'r Corp. v. Page Eng'r Co.,.484 F.2d
27, 33 (8th Cir. 1973); Albert Levine Associates v. Bertoni & Cotti, 314 F. Supp. 169,
170 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252, 259 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Cf. Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384
U.S. 202, 204-05 (1966) (liberalizing purpose underlies 1948 amendment to § 1391(c)).
But see Honda Associates, Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 891-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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statute: a district will now always exist in which venue will lie. This
alone made it a significant improvement in federal venue. Still, since
some of the old problems refused to vanish, 50 it was far from a panacea
for known difficulties. Worse yet, new ambiguities and questions materi-
alized where none had existed before.
II. The 1966 Amendment in Operation
A. Construction
From the beginning, commentators predicted that the new lan-
guage would breed litigation.5' Shortly after the statute became effec-
tive, the Supreme Court had occasion to comment on its scope in Denver
& Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen.52 The Court, in the course of deciding to apply the amend-
ment retrospectively, held unequivocally that the new phrase left the
substantive law applicable to a case unchanged because its effect was
wholly procedural.5 3 The Court's only additional opportunity to consider
the statute arose peripherally in the opinion in Brunette Machine Works,
Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.54 There it stressed that the 1966
amendment was intended to close the gap in venue law that had existed
for multiple-plaintiff or multiple-defendant cases, saying simply that "in
construing venue statutes it is reasonable to prefer the construction that
avoids leaving such a gap."55 Avoidance of gaps and care not to permit
substantive changes because of the amendment seem straightforward
guidelines as far as they go. Nevertheless, the lower courts have had a
more difficult time with the amendment than this scanty appellate
attention would indicate.
The first problem in construing the new language lies in the
provision that venue will lie in "the" district where the claim arose.
Logically, the use of the definite article ought to imply that only one
district exists that matches the description, but this reading is undesir-
50. E.g., the narrower scope of federal question venue and the dependency on state
long-arm statutes.
51. See Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and Convenience of Place of Trial:
Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73, 78 (1968). Foster feared that
the phrase would "unnecessarily [invite] litigation," preferring the ALI proposal.
52. 387 U.S. 556, 563 (1967).
53. Id. Justice Black agreed in his dissent that the amendment applied to pending
cases. Id. at 570. The Fifth Circuit followed the directive to apply the amendment
retroactively in Penrod Drilling Co. v. Johnson, 414 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
54. 406 U.S. 706, 710 n.8 (1972).
55. Id.
399
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able because the policies behind the venue statute would allow most
claims to be adjudicated in any one of several districts."6 For pragmatic
reasons, therefore, the courts have been receptive to the idea that "the"
judicial district can refer to any district in which a substantial or
significant part of the claim arose.5 7 Related to the question of the
number of permissible districts is the meaning of "the claim." It might
mean the largest part of a claim (or the whole claim, whatever that
would be), but it might mean either a substantial part of a claim, or just
any part that was not de minimis. 8 If either of the latter two construc-
tions were adopted, the effect would be to allow nonexclusive districts in
by the back door. On the other hand, it is difficult to pin down a
satisfactory definition of a "claim." One court bravely tried, holding that
"claim" meant "the aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right
enforceable in the courts," 59 but nothing assures that the facts are
susceptible to aggregation in such a way as to point to one and only one
district for venue. This implication that only one district must be found
is one of the greatest weaknesses of the new statute.
Even if it were possible to know with certainty what a claim was
and how much of it was required to establish venue, it would still be
difficult to determine where it "arose." Substantive law often assigns one
place rather arbitrarily as the place where the claim arose, such as the
place of execution or place of performance in contract law or the place
of manufacture or place of sale in products liability law.6 Federal law
obviously governs this issue in a federal question case, but the courts
have become hopelessly confused over which law governs in a diversity
56. For example, in an antitrust case many districts might serve the convenience of
the parties equally well. To fix the locus of the claim in any one place could be
extremely artificial. The same is true of products liability'cases. Cf. Comment, Choice
of Law: Statutes of Limitations in the Multistate Products Liability Case, 48 Tu. L.
REv. 1130 (1974).
57. See generally Judge Friendly's suggestion in Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland,
426 F.2d 1379, 1382 n.4 (2d Cir. 1970); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Ever-Dry Corp., 290 F.
Supp. 735, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Cf. Rosen v. Solomon, 374 F. Supp. 915, 919-20
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (immaterial for personal jurisdiction that contract may have had
significant connections with other states). See generally AUI STUDY, supra note 43.
58. Honda Associates, Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 890
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). The Honda Associates court found it unnecessary to decide between
"largest" and "substantial." Earlier, the Eighth Circuit had followed the ALl's definition
and used "substantial." Gardner Eng'r Corp. v. Page Eng'r Co., 484 F.2d 27, 33 (8th
Cir. 1973). SeeALISTuDY, supra note 43, §§ 1303(a)(1), 1314(a)(1).
59. Ryan v. Glenn, 52 F.R.D. 185, 192 (N.D: Miss. 1971); accord, Geodynamics
Oil & Gas, Inc. v. U.S. Silver & Mining Corp., 358 F. Supp. 1345, 1347 (S.D. Tex.
1973); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Sperberg, 63 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
60. E.g., Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Cf. TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (1964).
400
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case,61 forgetting that venue, as a procedural matter, does not come
under the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.62 As a result, plaintiffs in
some districts must ascertain the place where the claim arose under state
law, and in other districts they must apply federal law.
B. Venue Versus Choice of Law
A corollary problem to the construction of the statute, reminiscent
of conflicts of law, is the question which district court's decision will
determine the law of the case insofar as venue is concerned. This
complication arises only if one party attempts to transfer the case to
another district under section 1406(a), s which governs transfer when
the first venue is "wrong." If plaintiff sued in the Western District of
Texas, but that court decided that the claim really arose in the Central
District of California, upon request the Texas court would transfer the
case to the California court. The California court would then probably
be free to make its own determination of where the claim arose under
the reasoning of Hoffman v. Blaski.64 In that case, Blaski had brought a
patent infringement suit in the Northern District of Texas. Defendants
moved to transfer to the Northern District of Illinois, a place where
plaintiff did not have the right to sue initially. Granting the motion, the
Texas court transferred the case; the Fifth Circuit refused to vacate the
district court's order. In Illinois, plaintiffs moved to remand the case to
the Texas court. Although the district judge denied this motion, the
Seventh Circuit granted a writ of mandamus ordering him to remand.
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits were then in direct conflict over the
question whether a district court had the power to transfer to a district
where plaintiff did not have the right to sue. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the Illinois court had the duty
to determine venue for itself.6 5 Thus, by analogy to the Hoffman situa-
tion, if the California court in the example above disagreed with the
61. See, e.g., Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
62. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970), requires
federal courts to follow state substantive law, both statutory and judge-made, in a
diversity case).
63. This type of problem might be less likely to arise with a § 1404(a) transfer,
since by hypothesis the first district is permissible under the statute. But see Hoffman v.
Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
64. 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
65. At least one district court has expressed great frustration and dissatisfaction with
the practical effect of the Hoffman result. Ferri v. United Aircraft Corp., 357 F. Supp.
814, 816 (D. Conn. 1973).
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Texas court and felt that the claim did arise in the Western District of
Texas, it would be free to transfer the case back to Texas. The specter
appears of the two courts sending the case back and forth ad
infinitum-the renvoi dilemma of conflicts." The absurdity of this
result is apparent. In the interest of efficient treatment of procedural
issues like venue, the first court's conclusion should be binding for that
litigation. Hoffman poses an obstacle to this solution only if it is extend-
ed to the amended language of section 1391. As Justice Frankfurter so
cogently pointed out in his dissent to Hoffman,67 a litigant should not be
kept perpetually shuttling from one district to another until the Supreme
Court rescues him; the statute should either make the first court's
determination final or at least minimize the likelihood of initial refusal
by broadening venue.
Hoffman's renvoi-like problem illustrates only one instance in
which the determination of federal venue seems to borrow concepts
from choice of law. Many of the tests that courts are evolving to ascer-
tain where a claim arose also derive from conflicts doctrine.68 This su-
perficial similarity, however, should not obscure the fundamentally dif-
ferent policies underlying the two areas. The movement in conflicts
analysis is away from a rigid, rule-oriented determination of the govern-
ing jurisdiction towards a flexible, policy-oriented interest analysis that
considers many factors9.6  Because the very law of the case depends on
the resolution of the interests of competing jurisdictions, a careful, pol-
icy-oriented approach is fully justified. Venue, in contrast, has no bear-
ing at all on the parties' substantive rights. Under Erie and Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 0 any federal court should apply
the same law on the merits. A matter that is solely a secondary proce-
dural question warrants a more predictable, mechanical approach. Cer-
66. Renvoi, defined in RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONFLICTS § 8 (1971), covers
the situation in which the forum state is directed by its own choice of law rule to apply
"the law" of another state. The Restatement specifically provides that "the law" refers
to local law exclusive of the choice of law rules in this particular context. Only in rare
instances, set out in Comment b to § 8, will the forum also apply the choice of law rules
of the second state. Otherwise, the problem of each state referring back to the other
would arise.
67. 363 U.S. at 345. Frankfurter argued that a single judicial appellate remedy
should be enough, stating that "a prior decision of a federal court on the unfundamental
issue of venue ought to receive a similar respect from a coordinate federal court when the
parties and the facts are the same." Id. at 350.
68. Among others are the weight of contacts test and the place of injury test
discussed below.
69. See generally Wechsler, Introduction to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS
vii-ix (1971).
70. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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tainly the risk of ending up in the "wrong" district is much less than the
risk of having the wrong substantive law govern the parties' rights. Ven-
ue's orientation toward convenience may thus argue for a more auto-
matic test than the interest analysis approach of choice of law.
C. Approaches for Determining Where the Claim Arose
A bewildering array of approaches has evolved, all purporting to
guide a court in deciding where a claim arose. Some courts, apparently
unaware that any tests exist, merely state their conclusions without
further elucidation. The opinions of other courts, while failing to cite
relevant cases or mention any specific "test," conform to one or more
categories after the fact. Finally, some judges have made an explicit
attempt to articulate a useful test and to apply it to the facts before
them. Yet even in this third category, a court may confront a dismaying
number of approaches in a new fact situation. The number of tests, in
itself an indication of the statute's shortcomings, renders it difficult to
predict which line of thought will appeal to a given judge in a particular
case. This in turn makes it difficult for the litigant to know whether or
not he has selected a proper forum. Of course, if he has guessed
incorrectly, the court would probably grant a section 1406(a) transfer,
but most plaintiffs would prefer to avoid the delay inherent in the
transfer process. In addition, the uncertainty of the area encourages
defendants to litigate the question of venue rather than to accept the
place of trial and move on to the merits. Even so, the following exami-
nation of each of the current tests shows that they are approaching a
workable analysis, and that they are clearly preferable to no discussion
at all.
1. Weight of contacts.--One of the more widely used ap-
proaches inquires where the "contacts" weigh most heavily." This test
71. The weight of contacts test was probably borrowed from the area of conflicts of
law. See RE ATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONFLICTS §§ 6, 9 (1971).
Herbert Wechsler's Introduction to the Second Restatement of Conflicts describes
"the jettisoning of a multiplicity of rigid rules in favor of standards of greater flexibility"
represented in the revised version:
Restatement Second supplants these [vested-rights] rules by the broad princi-
ple that rights and liabilities with respect to a particular issue are determined
by the local law of the State which, as to that issue, has "the most significant
relationship" to the occurrence and the parties. The "factors relevant" to that
appraisal, absent a binding statutory mandate, are enumerated generally (§
6) to "include":
"(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
"(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
"(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative in-
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was inaugurated in Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radia-
tor & Standard Sanitary Corp.,"2 an antitrust action in which the plain-
tiffs unsuccessfully tried to preserve venue by using the general venue
statute as a supplement to the Clayton Act venue provision.7" Although
the court found no fault with this as a matter of law,7 4 it found that
venue failed even under the more generous statute, since the claim did
not arise in its district. It explained its test as follows:
"[Where the claim arose" should be dependent upon where
the contacts weigh most heavily. A "weight of the contacts"
test would enable venue to exist in a district where the injury
occurred, if significant sales causing substantial injury were
made to plaintiffs there by defendants. If some other overt
act pursuant to the conspiratorial meetings took place in a
district and it was a significant and substantial element of the
offense, then venue would lie in that district.75
As the court phrased its test, it is not clear whether it thought that only
one district would exist in which the contacts weighed most heavily, or
whether the "significant sales" and "other overt act" parts were in the
alternative, with venue possibly lying in each district. Although the latter
construction would be preferable, it is slightly strained, given the court's
use of the word "most," which implies that only one place would be
proper.
The courts that have followed Philadelphia Housing have reflected
this ambiguity. In Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.,70 a securities fraud
case, the district court seized on the word "most" and concluded that
venue was not proper in its district, since the weight of contacts lay
terests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
"(d) the protection of justified expectations,
"(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
"(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
"(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied."
Wechsler, Introduction to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS at vil-viii (1971). See
also Weintraub, Beyond Dipegage: A "New Rule" Approach to Choice of Law in
Consumer Credit Transactions and a Critique of the Territorial Application of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 25 CAsE W. REs. L. Rv. 16, 17 (1974).
72. 291 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
74. Accord, United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F.
Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Arnold v. Smith Motor Co., 389 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Iowa
1974). But see Albert Levine Associates v. Bertoni & Cotti, 309 F. Supp. 456, 461
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Accepting the premise that venue statutes should be liberally con-
strued in order to minimize time spent on subsidiary issues, the result stating that the
antitrust venue statute merely supplemented the general statute seems wise.
75. 291 F. Supp. at 260-61.
76. 331 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd, 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
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overwhelmingly in Canada.77 The Eighth Circuit reversed,78 apparently
accepting the view that if contacts are ponderous enough, venue is
proper, even though they have considerable weight in other districts or
jurisdictions as well. Two antitrust cases likewise adopted different
interpretations of the Philadelphia Housing test. In ABC Great States,
Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co. 7 9 the court employed the method used by the
Travis district court: it looked to the most significant conspiratorial acts
for the key to venue, because it feared that a "significant sales causing
substantial injury" approach would not limit venue sufficiently, given
the nationwide scope of the conspiracy. Implicit in this holding is the
value judgment that it is desirable (or perhaps necessary) to limit ven-
ue-a questionable assumption if the conspiracy in fact had a substan-
tial effect on a large number of districts. In contrast, a district court
applying the weight of contacts test in California Clippers, Inc. v. United
States Soccer Football Association0 concluded as did the Eighth Circuit
that it had venue upon finding several significant contacts within its own
district. It specifically found immaterial the fact that significant contacts
had also taken place in other districts. A third court phrased its conclu-
sion about the weight of contacts in the alternative, finding they were
either in Virginia or in California, but definitely not in Pennsylvania.81
Thus, it appeared to be on the side of the Travis district court.
Two courts have used the weight of contacts test in a result-
oriented way. Both cases were private actions brought under the anti-
trust laws alleging conspiratorial acts.2 In an action against the Atlantic
Coast Football League, the district court found that plaintiff had failed
to prove that the claim arose where "[t]here [was] no indication . . .
that the ACFL had a member team or participated in football exhibi-
tions or derived any substantial benefit from activities carried on within
this jurisdiction during the pendency of this action."88 The court's
inclusion of derivation of benefit from acts within the district implies
77. 331 F. Supp. at 806.
78. 473 F.2d at 529.
79. 310 F. Supp. 739, 743 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
80. 314 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
81. Fox-Keller, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 812, 816
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
82. United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565
(N.D. Ill. 1975); Redmond v. Atlantic Coast Football League, 359 F. Supp. 666, 670
(S.D. Ind. 1973).
83. 359 F. Supp. at 670, relying on Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1968) and California
Clippers, Inc. v. United States Soccer Football Ass'n, 314 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
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that acts carried on there whose effects are felt elsewhere may establish
venue. Another district court established venue in the district where the
effects were felt from acts committed elsewhere. In an action against the
American Association of Orthodontists for their refusal to certify a part-
time school, the Illinois court supported its own venue in part on the
basis of conspirators' meetings in Texas and Missouri that were designed
to block the Illinois plaintiff's certification. 4 The common thread of
these two cases is that in each the court bifurcated act and result for the
purpose of venue analysis. Viewing weight of contacts as a liberal,
balancing approach, these decisions seem sound. As a prima facie
matter, either an act or its result should be enough of a contact to secure
venue in the district.
The Northern District of Iowa presently holds the prize for the
most liberal application to date of the weight of contacts test. In Arnold
v. Smith Motor Co.8 5 the court carefully considered the developments in
venue law since the 1966 amendment and analyzed the new statute in
light of the policies behind modern venue. It purported to find precedent
for an approach in which the court's only task was to refuse venue where
the contacts were miniscule. 8  The court finally appealed directly to the
purpose and policy of venue to justify its view of the law:
Venue has been considered as the place where jurisdic-
tion may be exercised, and while it affords some protection
to defendants, it is designed to facilitate the maximum con-
venience for all the litigants. . . . The 1966 Amendment
to § 1391 evidenced a concern for a forum convenient to the
aggrieved party as well as the defendant. . . . Modern
means of transportation and the availability of a motion for
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 in a case of extreme incon-
venience have obviated the need for a strict venue rule based
on a theory of geographic hardship to the defendant.8 7
When the 1966 amendment receives this kind of enlightened construc-
tion, the law has achieved as much as can be hoped for. To the extent
84. 396 F. Supp. at 574.
85. 389 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
86. The court cited Honda Associates, Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp.
886 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) for this proposition. 389 F. Supp. at 1023. This seems to turn
Honda on its head: in that case, the overwhelming weight of contacts was in California.
Transferring, the Southern District of New York judge commented that it was unneces-
sary to decide whether the largest part of a claim arose in his district or merely a
substantial part, for it was clear that "the claim should not be deemed to have arisen in a
district in which the defendant has had only miniscule contact... "' 374 F. Supp. at
892. Thus the Arnold court's use of Honda seems a bit misguided at best.
87. 389 F. Supp. at 1024 (citations omitted).
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that the weight of contacts test permits this flexibility, it provides a
welcome gloss on the statute. As the cases illustrate, however, the test is
not always understood, and when understood, it is not always so hospit-
ably received. Weight of contacts analysis best adapts to conspiracy
cases, or to cases involving a large number of acts by businesses or
individuals with substantial contacts in many jurisdictions. The weak-
ness of the present law lies in the danger that a court will weigh contacts
with an eye to confining the number of districts that will be entitled to
adjudicate the case. If as a policy matter the decision were made to
permit venue in any forum with a logical connection to the lawsuit, the
weight of contacts test would simply help the court to structure its
decision on the logic and appropriateness of venue.
2. Place of injury.-The place of injury presents the major alter-
native to the weight of contacts approach. 8 Frequently in this area the
test adopted by the court can only be inferred from the opinion; occa-
sionally, a judge affixes a label to his analytic approach. Although
courts apply this test most often to tort actions, it too has been used in
the antitrust area. The first case to hold that the claim arose in the
district where the injury occurred was Rosen v. Savant Instruments,
Inc.," a wrongful death action. The issue came before the court in the
form of a motion to transfer under section 1404(a)90 from the Eastern
District of New York to the District of Rhode Island, where plaintiffs'
decedent had been electrocuted. The court granted the transfer, stating
simply that the claim obviously did arise in Rhode Island, because that
was where the alleged wrongful death occurred."' This type of case
benefits most from the 1966 amendment, and causes the least difficulty.
Even in the tort area, however, the critical injury would be difficult to
isolate in a business or products liability context. The fact of the matter
is that several districts should all be equally available.z Despite the logic
of multiple availability, place of injury seems more prone to give rise to
indefensible and nit-picking exclusivity: in one patent infringement
88. Compare this with the old vested rights approach to choice of law. See Wechsler,
Introduction, supra note 69; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS §§ 311, 377 (1934).
89. 264 F. Supp. 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
90. Courts do not analyze where a claim arose any differently under the transfer
statutes than upon a challenge to plaintiff's initial choice of venue, since a claim "might
have been brought" only where venue was initially proper. See Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 624 (1964); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1960).
91. See also Miller v. Cousins Properties, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 711 (D. Vt. 1974).
92. As a practical matter, a number of districts are available to the products liability
litigator. See, e.g., Noyer, Problems of Federal and State Court Jurisdiction and Venue
in Products Liability Litigation-Defendant's Viewpoint, 40 J. oF AIR L. & CoM. 637
(1974).
407
HeinOnline  -- 54 Tex. L. Rev. 407 1975-1976
Texas Law Review
case, the court decided that the right to a declaratory judgment arose
during a conference in New York, where the patentee threatened litiga-
tion, rather than in Ohio, where he filed suit ten days later.93 In an
indemnity case, the court with some justification upheld its own venue
by referring back to the place of the original tort to determine where the
claim arose.94 Although sound reasons can be advanced for selecting the
place of injury, in an indemnity action an equally persuasive argument
can often be made for other locations, such as where the company paid
the claim, or the company headquarters. Furthermore, while the logic of
these decisions may be supportable after the fact, they offer little assist-
ance as precedent.
The two antitrust cases that have employed the place of injury test
are not easily distinguishable from those that used weight of contacts.95
One possible difference, however, is the fact that both cases using place
of injury involved the alleged destruction of one business. The court in
each case made the assumption that the place of injury was the same as
the company's headquarters, or principal place of business.96 One judge
explained his rejection of the weight of contacts approach by his inabili-
ty to accept a scheme requiring "an evaluation of a specific calculus of
contacts. 917 Certainly the weight of contacts test is vulnerable to charges
of subjectivity or arbitrariness, which apparently lay behind the judge's
objection. By the same token, place of injury can be accused of undue
rigidity. The difficulty lies in the conflicting desires on the one hand for
a reliable test, and on the other hand for a test so tailored to the facts
under consideration that it produces the most convenient place of trial.
One court employed an inversion of the place of injury approach,
turning its gaze to where the litigation results would be felt, in Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Co.98 Although the court asserted that venue for one defendant,
the National Mediation Board, existed under section 1391 (e), 99 it had
93. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Sperberg, 63 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
94. Kroger Co. v. Adkins Transfer Co., 284 F. Supp. 371 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), af!'d
sub nom. Kroger Co. v. Dornbos, 408 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1969).
95. Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A. v. Moraites, 377 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Albert Levine Associates v. Bertoni & Cotti, 314 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
96. In an earlier opinion the Albert Levine court suggested that the place where
plaintiff's distributorship was located might be where the injury arose. Albert Levine
Associates v. Bertoni & Cotti, 309 F. Supp. 456, 461 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
97. 377 F. Supp. at 647.
98. 290 F. Supp. 612 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1969).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1970). This subsection establishes venue for suits in
which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States, or an agency of the
United States.
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to rely on section 1391(b) to sustain venue for the union defendant. In
what was probably dictum, the court commented that "[tihough the
particular action which plaintiff seeks to enjoin would be taken in the
District of Columbia where the NMB is headquartered, the impact and
operation of any such action would be felt in this district and it is here,
therefore, that the cause of action arises." 10 What the injunction against
the Board had to do with the location of actions taken by the union
defendant the court left to the imagination. Nevertheless, the place
where the impact of the relief requested from the lawsuit would be felt
may be another conceivable place "where the claim arose," although it
does seem to put the cart before the horse.
Another variation on place of injury analysis relies more directly on
the location of the organization's headquarters as the place where the
claim arose, without ever discussing whether or not injury actually
occurred there. Thus in Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Industries,
Inc., 0 1 the court held that it was preferable to litigate the claim in
Colorado, where allegedly deceptive proxies and accompanying state-
ments were prepared by the defendant company, instead of in Missouri,
where the materials were received and shareholders presumably de-
ceived. Apparently it felt that the claim "arose" in both districts, since it
transferred under section 1404(a). In a case under the statute prohibit-
ing the use of federally appropriated funds to influence a congressman's
vote,' 02 the court held that a claim against an unincorporated association
of state unemployment offices arose in the District of Columbia, since
the organization had a central office there, funds were appropriated
there, and Congress met there.10 3 This "nerve center" type of approach
was also applied in a civil rights suit brought to declare unconstitutional
a Pennsylvania rule suspending the driver's licenses of automobile acci-
dent judgment debtors.' 4 On the other hand, in Jimenez v. Pierce,'05 a
prisoner's civil rights suit in which the plaintiff wanted to sue in the
district where the headquarters of the state agency he claimed had
injured him was located, the court rejected "nerve center" venue. Plain-
tiff was incarcerated in the Northern District of New York, and all of the
100. 290 F. Supp. at 616. The court cited Montana and California authority for its
conclusion-persuasively, one would hope.
101. 313 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1970).
103. National Ass'n for Community Development v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399
(D.D.C. 1973).
104. Leonhart v. McCormick, 395 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
105. 315 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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activities listed in his complaint had occurred there. The court held that
even if the agency had directed the abuses from the Southern District,
the claim did not arise there. All relevant actions had taken place in the
Northern District; hence the weight of the contacts existed there. Thus
the headquarters test has received some acceptance, but if substantially
all of the activities were executed elsewhere, or if judicial economy
would be better served elsewhere, a court might order the suit tried in
that district, either on weight of contacts or place of injury grounds.
3. Substantive law.-In some cases the courts have made no
attempt to use a generalized venue test; instead they have searched for
rules from a particular substantive field to justify their results. In the
area of contracts, the dispute rages over whether the place of negotia-
tions, the place of execution, or the place of performance governs. 106
Unhappily, the courts have viewed these as mutually exclusive. The
statute may not compel this interpretation, but the flexible attitude
manifested in more complex areas such as antitrust has not been carried
over to the more traditional areas. Trademark infringements, for exam-
ple, might arise in the district in which the products were sold, or they
might arise in the district where the name confusion occurred. 1 7 In
addition, by narrowing the inquiry to one substantive topic, the courts
have introduced a new complication. If this question is one of substan-
tive law, to which jurisdiction must they look for an answer? Since the
Supreme Court has specifically held that venue is procedural, 08 the
federal courts should not feel bound by the state law locating a cause of
action, although if no federal precedent exists the state rule might
provide useful guidelines. Ideally, any of the places commonly recog-
nized as significant to the claim would be permissible for venue.
4. No reasoning.-Some cases decided under the amendment
concluded so uninformatively that the claim did or did not arise in the
district that any attempt to rationalize the decision would be pure
106. See Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (contract claim
arose in district where contract executed and payments made, not in district where
preliminary negotiations took place); M. Dean Kaufman, Inc. v. Warnaco, Inc., 299 F.
Supp. 722 (D. Conn. 1969) (contract claim arose in district where contract was
formalized, not in district where party failed to perform).
107. See Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184, 190 (D. Del.
1974) (where confused); Car-Freshner Corp. v. Broadway Mfg. Co., 337 F. Supp.
618, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (where products sold, not where labels affixed or where
goods wrapped).
108. See Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556
(1967). Even according to the modem view, choice of law principles usually provide
that the forum state procedural rules apply regardless of which substantive law governs.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §§ 122-43 (1971).
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speculation. In some cases, the court relied on the facts in the record;""9
in other cases it set out facts that would support venue, but never spelled
out the inferences it drew from those facts." 0 In some circumstances the
courts referred to the allegations in the plaintiffs pleadings alone'-a
practice defensible to a point, since under the better view the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving venue once the defendant has raised the
defense under Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,"' but less desirable than reviewing the entire record." 3 Some
courts give no clue whatsoever, implicit or explicit, about their reason-
ing." 4 Perhaps these courts thought the answer so obvious that an
explanation would be frivolous. Nevertheless, with the troubles plaguing
other courts, it could only help the overall situation to articulate why a
particular case was an easy one. Clear understanding of standards is
essential if the area is to achieve any certainty and predictability.
5. Evaluation.-The consequences of inability to decide where a
claim arose have ranged from dismissal of the case, to severance and
transfer to another district, to a simple remand for further factfinding.
The statute has truly failed in its purpose where, as in Javelin Corp. v.
Uniroyal, Inc.," 5 a court sees no alternative to dismissal of the suit. In
that case, a private antitrust action, the defendants' operations were
national in scope, and the defendants themselves were scattered
throughout the country. The only significant events in the Northern
District of California were an industry-wide sales meeting and a meeting
for the alleged purpose of approving illegal exclusionary arrangements.
The defendants acted as agents for a manufacturing group within the
district. After setting out these facts, the court concluded without further
109. Miller v. Cousins Properties, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 711 (D. Vt. 1974); Alabama
Great Southern R.R. v. Allied Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Va. 1970).
110. McCrory Corp. v. Cloth World, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Junior
Spice, Inc. v. Turbotville Dress, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
111. D'Amico v. Treat, 379 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. 111. 1974); Walker v. Kawasaki
Motors Corp., 62 F.R.D. 607 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Morton Bldgs. of Nebraska, Inc. v.
Morton Bldgs., Inc., 333 F. Supp. 187 (D. Neb. 1971).
112. See generally 5 C. WiGHiT & A. MILLER, FEDmEAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1352 (1969).
113. See Davidge v. White, 377 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (case held pending
submission of factual affidavits by both parties on the question of venue).
114. Daugherty v. Procunier, 456 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 1972); Kletschka v. Driver,
411 F.2d 436, 442 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); Litton Business Sys., Inc. v. Paul L'Esperance, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Besuner v. Faberge, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1974). Cf. Tiernan
v. Westext Transport, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (§ 1391 (f) case);
Smith v. Konsak, 230 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (same).
115. 360 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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discussion that neither venue nor personal jurisdiction was present in its
district and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case. Unless a
court actually believes plaintiff's claim to be frivolous or in bad faith, it
is hard to justify dismissing for improper venue, for section 1406(a)
does permit transfer in this situation. Furthermore, the same court
several years earlier had applied the weight of contacts test and found
that several contacts of significance with the jurisdiction were sufficient
to establish venue.116 If the result in Javelin is the harbinger of a trend
toward stricter scrutiny of the propriety of venue, then that decision flies
in the face of the congressional trend to broaden permissible places of
trial. If the discrepancy in the two decisions simply points out the highly
subjective nature of the contacts evaluation, then perhaps the courts
need a better test or a more workable statutory standard.
In two recent cases, the courts felt it was important to pinpoint the
location of the accidents or transactions in order to place venue in the
precise district where the claim arose. In the first, Davidge v. White," 7
the pleadings lacked sufficient factual allegations to enable the court to
make the determination, and therefore the case was remanded. Since the
complaint did allege that the claim was for recovery of funds that
defendant had obtained in stock transactions occurring within the dis-
trict, the court's approach was unnecessarily picky. The second, Chance
v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.," 8 was a multiple tort action brought
in New York, in which children from a number of states were injured by
blasting caps. First pointing out that the applicable substantive law was
not the law of New York, the court held that "[f]or this and other
reasons these actions must be severed and transferred to the federal
district court in the respective jurisdictions where the accidents oc-
curred,"" 9 citing section 1404(a). Under section 1404(a), each claim
"might have been brought" in the state where the child was injured.
Considerations of judicial economy could lead either to approval or
disapproval of the court's action. On one hand, each child would be
trying to prove the same facts against the manufacturer, which argues
for keeping the action in New York. On the other hand, the New York
court must follow Erie and Klaxon, which require it to obey the New
York conflicts of law rules in a diversity case. It could therefore be in
116. California Clippers, Inc. v. United States Soccer Football Ass'n, 314 F. Supp.
1057 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
117. 377 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
118. 371 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
119. Id. at 441.
412
Vol. 54,392, 1976
HeinOnline  -- 54 Tex. L. Rev. 412 1975-1976
Federal Venue
the position of applying the law of six or seven different states in one
trial, probably a difficult and time-consuming task. These problems are
beyond the scope of the venue statute. Nevertheless, insofar as federal
venue is concerned, it should be clear that the New York court could
keep the case if it decided in its discretion that the claim arose in the
place of manufacture as well as in the place of injury. Hopefully the
Chance court was transferring "in the interest of justice" and not
because it believed it was compelled to refuse venue.
As the variety of tools the courts have evolved to answer the
question where the claim arose indicates, the 1966 amendment to the
venue statute spawned litigation where none had existed before.1
20
Events that give rise to lawsuits do not tend to be packaged neatly with
labels informing observers of their origins. At present, venue becomes
an issue in the case when the defendant asserts improper venue in a
responsive pleading or motion under Rule 12(b)(3). 2 ' If the defense is
not properly raised by a motion or in a responsive pleading, Rule
12(h)(1) provides that it is waived.1 2 Once the issue is raised, some
confusion exists as to which party bears the burden of proving his
point.' 23 Professors Wright and Miller take the view that the obligation
should be the plaintiff's, since plaintiff must justify jurisdiction.' 24 This
rule makes sense, provided that the showing plaintiff must make is not
too difficult. The best solution to the problems with the current venue
statute would require plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of proper
venue. To support his chosen forum, plaintiff should need to demon-
strate only that the district bears some logical relationship to the claim.
The weight of contacts test as applied in Arnold v. Smith Motor Co.,
12 5
mandating rejection only for districts with minisucle contacts, embodies
the spirit of this approach. Once plaintiff's prima facie case is made out,
defendant could not change districts without a strong showing of incon-
120. Although there has been a fair amount of litigation in the district courts on the
meaning of the new phrase, very few cases have reached the courts of appeals. This
probably results in part from the newness of the statute, but more importantly from the
parties' unwillingness to expend the time and money necessary to litigate venue that
persistently. Nevertheless, this puts the district courts in a difficult position, since they
lack guidance on the resolution of the problems that have arisen.
121. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(3).
122. Id. 12(h)(1).
123. Compare United States v. Orshek, 164 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1947) (burden on
defendant), with Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 420 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir.
1969) (burden on plaintiff).
124. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1352, at 570
(1969).
125. 389 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
413
HeinOnline  -- 54 Tex. L. Rev. 413 1975-1976
Texas Law Review
venience. 126 If defendant were able to meet this stringent test, the court
would have the power to transfer under either section 1406(a), if it
decided that venue was utterly improper, or under section 1404(a), if it
decided that a more convenient district existed. Absent fairly extraordi-
nary circumstances, plaintiffs choice should stand undisturbed.
The American Law Institute's proposal, which provides for venue
where "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim occurred,"' would facilitate and encourage this approach. The
drafters took care to insure that more than one district might satisfy the
standard.1 28 Although they acknowledged that controversy was possible
over what constituted "a substantial part," their feeling was that difficul-
ties would arise only when the plaintiff was taking a deliberate
chance.1 29 The correctness of this conclusion depends entirely on a
court's interpretation of the word "substantial." If it construes the word
to include anything not insubstantial or insignficant, like the Arnold
court, then the drafters were probably right. Subject to a de minimis
limitation, plaintiffs choice of venue would always be upheld unless
he were guilty of bad faith or unless defendant could persuade the
court to transfer on a strong showing of inequity. The danger neverthe-
less exists that the courts will read "substantial" as something analogous
to over fifty percent, or over thirty percent, like the Chance court. If this
happens, then the ALI's proposal would simply add one more question
to be litigated.
It is difficult to capture in words the precise factors that would
guarantee the more desirable construction. Perhaps it is better to stop
talking about parts of claims and to say simply that the plaintiffs choice
of venue should be upheld if his claim bears a logical connection to the
forum, unless the defendant makes a satisfactory showing of hardship.
Under this formulation, plaintiff's initial showing would be quite easy;
in most controverted cases the defendant would bear the burden of
upsetting plaintiffs choice. In this way venue matters may be relegated
at last to the secondary position they deserve. After all, little harm
would result if a federal question case were litigated in one district
126. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947); North Branch
Prod., Inc. v. Fisher, 284 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 827 (1961);
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 371 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Combustion Eng'r, Inc. v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Mo.
1970).
127. ALI STuny, supra note 43, §§ 1303, 1314.
128. Id. at 137.
129. Id.
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rather than another. If the premise behind diversity jurisdiction is the
need for unbiased, unprejudiced forums for citizens of different states,
one federal court should be as good as another. The original court is
always free to transfer to a court in the state whose law will apply if the
facts warrant the transfer. Plaintiffs should not be forced to second-
guess a court's view of where a claim arose if their choice of venue is at
all defensible.
D. Other Problems
1. Service of process.-At the time Congress amended the venue
statute, commentators criticized the revised version for its continued
reliance on the long-arm statute of the forum state with regard to
amenability to process. 130 If a defendant was not amenable to process
from any district in which venue was appropriate, plaintiff would still be
frustrated in his lawsuit. Happily, this has proved to be a lesser problem
than the general confusion about the distinction between personal juris-
diction requirements and venue requirements. Service of process is
normally controlled by state law, while venue is governed by a federal
statute.131 Yet in one case a federal court relied on state venue decisions
to resolve questions of personal jurisdiction.3 2 Even worse, another
court purported to rely on section 1391 for jurisdiction over the subject
matter.133 Some courts appear to equate amenability to process with
satisfaction of venue requirements. 3 4 Thus the more frequent problem
with personal jurisdiction arises from a failure to make a sharp distinc-
tion between the concepts of power over the person and convenience of
the lawsuit's location; the federal courts' technical dependence on the
scope of the applicable state long-arm statute has forced very few dis-
missals."l 5
130. Foster, supra note 51. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
131. See notes 142 to 167 infra & accompanying text, on the debate over the role
state law plays within the federal statute.
132. Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Textured Fibres, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 491
(D.S.C. 1970).
133. Langston v. Ciccone, 313 F. Supp. 56 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
134. Colorado-Florida Living, Inc. v. Deltona Corp., 338 F. Supp. 880 (D. Colo.
1972) (same test used to determine transaction of business for purposes of state long-
arm statute and federal venue statute "where the claim arose"); Hawaii Credit Card
Corp. v. Continental Credit Card Corp., 290 F. Supp. 848 (D. Haw. 1968) (confused
constitutional limits of long-arm jurisdiction with venue statute's requirements).
135. The only case since the 1966 amendment to dismiss for personal jurisdiction
limitations in the state long-arm statute appears to be Parham v. Edwards, 346 F. Supp.
968 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1973).
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2. Division venue.-Whether the claim should be heard in one
particular division of a district poses a greater problem than service of
process. One court, citing sections 1391(b) and 1406(a), transferred a
claim to another division within its district.'36 The court's use of section
1406(a) indicates that it thought venue was improper in its own divi-
sion. This restrictive gloss on the statute is unnecessary, because sections
1391(a) and (b) nowhere mention division, and transfers from one
division to another within a single district would do nothing but prolong
the litigation.
In Torres v. Continental Bus Systems, Inc.,,3 7 the district court
justified its transfer of the case to another division within the district by
reasoning that section 1393(a) 38 confers a personal privilege on the
defendant to be sued in the division of its residence. Since section
1391(c) makes a foreign corporation suable anywhere that it does
business, the corporation is considered a resident of that district for
venue purposes. Therefore, the court reasoned, a corporation is a resi-
dent of the divisions where it does business for purposes of section
1393(c). The Torres court did not consider two arguments later ad-
vanced by another district court in Medicenters of America, Inc. v. T
and V Realty & Equipment Corp.13 9 that would lead to a different
result. First, section 1393 might come into play only if the defendant's
residence is the sole basis for venue. Where venue can rest on another
basis, such as the plaintiffs residence or the place where the claim arose,
venue is proper in any division within the district. Second, by referring
to the place "where he resides," Congress may have intended to limit
division venue under section 1393(a) to individual defendants. Section
1391 itself uses the pronoun "it" where it intends to refer to corpora-
tions, and it avoids pronouns where both corporations and natural
persons are covered.' 4 °
The contrast between the general venue statute and the venue
statute governing removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), also suggests that
136. Wingard v. North Carolina, 366 F. Supp. 982 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
137. 204 F. Supp. 347 (S.D. Tex. 1962).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1393(a) (1970) provides: "Except as otherwise provided, any civil
action, not of a local nature, against a single defendant in a district containing more than
one division must be brought in the division where he resides."
139. 371 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D. Va. 1974) (alternative holding).
140. Within the general venue statutes, the pronoun "it" refers to a corpora-
tion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970). But see id. § 1400(a) (patent and copy-
right venue-refers to defendant or his agent); id. § 1401 (stockholder's derivative
action venue-refers to stockholder on behalf of his corporation). In contrast, sections
1391(a) and (b) do not use pronouns.
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division is of no independent significance in the former instance. The
removal venue statute expressly directs the court to look to the district
and division embracing the place where the action is pending. Thus,
removal venue relies indirectly on the venue statute of the state where
the action was originally brought. The absence of this kind of limiting
language in section 1391, and the undesirability of restricting venue
where Congress did not mandate restriction both suggest that division
venue should not apply to the language "where the claim arose." Simi-
larly, state statutes setting venue for state lawsuits should be irrelevant,
or at most only persuasive authority, in determining federal venue under
section 1391.14 .
3. What law governs.-At the time Congress amended the venue
statute in 1966, the question whether state law or federal law would
govern "where the claim arose" would not have been likely to excite
controversy. It was "hombook law that where a federal statute fixes
the venue of the federal courts, state laws are inapplicable."1 42 Courts
regularly recited the need for a uniform federal standard for venue143
and the unacceptability of permitting state venue laws to interfere with
this standard. 44 Thus, after the 1966 amendment had been in operation
for a time, it came as a great surprise to many that the problem of
applicable law should be an issue at all.
The Sixth Circuit discussed the policies behind the venue statutes
in some detail in Miller v. Davis,145 a diversity case. The district court
had erroneously concluded that a Kentucky choice of law rule precluded
federal jurisdiction. After the court of appeals firmly corrected that
misconception, it reached the venue issue. It held explicitly that venue
was a procedural matter within the Erie doctrine and that state venue
law did not control federal venue.1 4 6 The importance of uniform appli-
cation of the federal venue statutes was too great to permit state laws to
141. See text accompanying notes 142-167 infra.
142. Murphree v. Mississippi Publ. Corp., 149 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1945),
afrd, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). See generally 1 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzOFF, FEDERAL
PRAcIrcE AND PROCED RE § 71 (Wright ed. 1960); 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTcE
0.140 [1.-3-1] (1975). Neither state substantive law nor state venue law should be
conclusive on a question of federal procedural law.
143. Remington Rand, Inc. v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F. Supp. 613, 617 (E.D. Pa.
1956).
144. Standard Ins. Co. v. Isbell, 143 F. Supp. 910, 912 (E.D. Tex. 1956); Shaffer v.
Tepper, 127 F. Supp. 892, 894 (E.D. Ky. 1955); Neal v. Pennsylvania R.R., 77 F. Supp.
423,425 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
145. 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974).
146. Id. at 316.
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override them.14 7
Confronted with a related issue, the Third Circuit also pointed out
that the venue of federal courts is a matter of federal law; a state may
not modify or repeal a federal venue statute by its own legislation."' 8
This holds true whether subject matter jurisdiction rests on a federal
question or on diversity. 149 Other courts have held that federal law
governs whether a corporation is "doing business" for section 1391(c)
purposes. 50 Many lower courts have supported this view. In Honda
Associates, Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc. 51 the court said that state
personal jurisdiction laws have no effect on the interpretation of the
federal venue statute. 52 Other courts have simply reaffirmed the vitality
of the old rule that venue fixed by a federal statute must be determined
by federal law.' 5 3 The farthest any court has gone without abandoning
the principle is to say that state law may be a significant aid in interpret-
ing the federal standard of section 1391.'5 Even this much might be an
unnecessary concession.
The district court decision in Philadelphia Housing Authority v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.'55 bears responsibility for
the notion that state law determines where a claim arose in a diversity
case. The court started from the premise that venue is a substantive
right, citing the Sixth Circuit's decision in Still v. Rossville Crushed
Stone Co.' 56 as authority. 5 7 Unfortunately, the court read Still incor-
rectly, although its mistake was understandable, given the confused
opinion in Still. The Still court was considering a traditional local cause
147. Id. at 317.
148. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Greenberg, 487 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 1973). Cf. Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (state law on appointment of ancillary estate
administrator does not affect federal venue).
149. 487 F.2d at 12.
150. Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822, 825 (10th Cir. 1963); Samson
Cordage Works v. Wellington Puritan Mills, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 155, 161 (D.R.I. 1969).
151. 374 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
152. Id. at 889. See International Business Coordinators, Inc. v. Aamco Automatic
Transmissions, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 361, 364 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (venue under 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970)).
153. Jaffe v. Dolan, 264 F. Supp. 845, 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); see aquinta v. Sloan,
350 F. Supp. 203, 204 (N.D.W. Va. 1972); ci. Control Data Corp. v. Carolina Power &
Light Co., 274 F. Supp. 336, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
154. Masterson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 53 F.R.D. 313, 316 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
155. 291 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
156. 370 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1966).
157. 291 F. Supp. at 260.
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of action.158 After it distinguished jurisdiction and venue on rather
conventional grounds, it proceeded to ask "whether under the law of
Tennessee judicial authority could be . .. exercised over the subject
matter of this cause." 159 Finding that Tennessee law said that injury to
real estate located in another state was not within the jurisdiction of the
Tennessee courts, the court quite properly dismissed the case. All it did
was apply state substantive law to a local action over which it had
diversity jurisdiction, in accordance with the Erie doctrine. The Sixth
Circuit itself in Miller, decided several years after Philadelphia Housing,
went to some trouble to point out that Still was a local action case,
having nothing to do with section 1391 venue; 60 it certainly was not a
holding that venue is a matter of substantive law. Thus, the entire
premise of the Philadelphia Housing dictum that state law governs
venue determinations under section 1391(a) was faulty.' 6 '
Notwithstanding the fundamental problem with the Philadelphia
Housing suggestion for diversity cases, a number of courts accepted the
reasoning and applied it in their own decisions. In Ryan v. Glenn 62 the
court held that the question where the claim arose depended on state
substantive law, because "the claim" meant "the aggregate of operative
facts giving rise to a right enforceable in the courts,"'163 and it also cited
Philadelphia Housing. The problem with its first ground of decision is
the circularity of the reasoning. One does not have a claim enforceable
in the federal courts until he has properly brought himself before the
court procedurally, by establishing subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction over the defendant (or jurisdiction over the res), and venue.
Thus it is just as easy to argue that "the claim" refers to federal
standards as it is to assert that it must incorporate state law by implica-
tion, which would be the legitimate way to bring state law into the
picture. The Ryan court even conceded that "it might be argued that
venue is procedural and purely a question of federal law under Erie,"
but it found the Philadelphia Housing view "more practical," and it
decided rather arbitrarily to follow it, having found no case law to the
158. The district court in Graham v. Hamilton County, 266 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Tenn.
1967), recognized the old local/transitory distinction at work in Still.
159. 370 F.2d at 325.
160. 507 F.2d at 316 n.16.
161. The conclusion was dictum because the case actually before the court was a
federal question case, for which the court applied a federal standard.
162. 52 F.R.D. 185, 192 (N.D. Miss. 1971). Accord, Warren Bros. Co. v. Commu-
nity Bldg. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 656, 662 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (dictum).
163. 52 F.R.D. at 192.
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contrary.1 64 The only conceivable practicality Philadelphia Housing
could offer would exist if substantive law provided the test for where the
claim arose; but as the federal courts develop uniform standards them-
selves, even in this area the stronger argument lies on the side of a
federal test. The other courts that have adopted a state standard have
simply assumed that they were required to do so, adding nothing to the
rationales of the courts that had preceded them.'65
Since both Philadelphia Housing and Ryan came after the Supreme
Court's decision in Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,'6" it is curious that the courts could
have reached the conclusion that the 1966 amendment required refer-
ence to state substantive law for the first time. The Court, albeit in the
context of deciding whether the amendment could be applied to pending
cases, clearly stated that the revision did not change the substantive law
applicable to the case, and that it was wholly procedural. 6 ' Logic, as
well as preamendment precedent and the holding of Denver & Rio
Grande, compels the conclusion that federal law alone governs the
question of federal venue. A contrary deduction based on a misunder-
standing of one brief per curiam court decision is neither desirable nor
inevitable.
HI. Conclusion
Despite the problems that have arisen, the 1966 amendment to the
federal venue statute was a step in the right direction. Many of the
difficulties encountered in the construction of the phrase added by the
amendment would be obviated if the requirements for plaintiff's prima
facie showing were extremely light, and the burden heavy on the defend-
ant seeking to move the case. In addition, it should be clear that any
district with more than miniscule contacts would satisfy the statute,
either by reading the present language broadly or by adding a logical
connection standard. This would be entirely consonant with the liberaliz-
ing purpose behind the amendment; any inequities caused by the rule
could be alleviated by judicious use of the transfer statutes. If the statute
164. Id. The court does cite Comment, Federal Venue Amendment-Service of
Process, Erie and Other Limitations, 16 CATH. LL REV. 297 (1967).
165. Geodynamics Oil & Gas, Inc. v. U.S. Silver & Mining Corp., 358 F. Supp. 1345
(S.D. Tex. 1973); Paragon Int'l N.V. v. Standard Plastics, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 88, 91
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
166. 387 U.S. 556 (1967).
167, Id. at 563, See note 142 supra.
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is applied and construed in a generous spirit, statutory change is proba-
bly unnecessary. The courts must articulate fully the bases for their
decisions, so that the analytic approaches they are using will develop
stability. Finally, uniformity and certainty in venue law cannot be
realized until the courts recognize that federal law governs the question
where the claim arose in diversity as well as federal question cases. By
deciding that the primary goal is to litigate cases on the merits, rather
than on subsidiary procedural issues, the federal courts will find it easier
to administer the statutory scheme for venue in the best interest of both
the litigants and the judiciary.
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